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and CHARLES J. Russo**
Religious liberty antedated the Bill of Rights in theory, and
occasionally even in practice.1 The free exercise of religion clause
of the first amendment places the protection of religious liberty at
the heart of the Bill of Rights. Within the legal academic commu-
nity, the jurisprudence of religious liberty recently has enjoyed a
renaissance.2 The United States Supreme Court, however, has
* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. B.A. 1973, Catholic University
of America; M.B.A. 1977, Wayne State University; J.D. 1980, University of Detroit; LL.M.
1982, J.S.D. 1987, Yale University.
** Assistant Professor, Fordhain University Graduate School of Education; B.A. 1972,
St. John's University; M. Div. 1978, Seminary of the Immaculate Conception; J.D. 1983, St.
John's University; Ed. D. 1989, St. John's University.
We have valiantly endeavored, but miserably failed, to minimize footnotes. m. elisabeth
bergeron, Executive Articles Editor of the St. John's Law Review, expressly encouraged all
authors to pursue a colloquial, dialogic format for this Symposium. We commend her for her
singularly courageous editorial efforts to militate against the turgid, grinding "style" that
generally afflicts most law review scholarship.
' See Adams & Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1559,
1562-68 (1989); McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1409, 1421-66 (1990).
2 See generally Adams & Emmerich, supra note 1 (investigating history of religion
clauses for animating principles helpful in deciding modern cases); Epstein, Religious Lib-
erty in the Welfare State, 31 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 375 (1990) (examining whether auton-
omy of modern religious institutions can survive pervasive government action typical of
modern welfare state); McConnell, supra note 1 (citing inattention to original meaning of
religion clauses as main factor behind modern Supreme Court decisions and reexamining
historical, philosophical, and legal understanding of framers in area); Noonan, The Consti-
tution's Protection of Individual Rights: The Real Role of the Religion Clauses, 49 U. PITT.
L. REv. 717 (1988) (tracing historical link between religion clauses and rights of individual
conscience); Smith, Establishment Clause Analysis: A Liberty Maximizing Proposal, 4 No-
TRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. PoL'Y 463 (1990) (arguing that where constitutional language
is ambiguous Court should not defer to legislature but take activist role to maximize lib-
erty); Smith, Nonpreferentialism in Establishment Clause Analysis: A Response to Profes-
sor Laycock, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 245 (1991) [hereinafter Smith, Nonpreferentialism] (ex-
amining historical and decisional support for nonpreferential approach to establishment
clause analysis).
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never been receptive to free exercise claims.3 On the eve of.the bi-
centennial celebration of the Bill of Rights, the Court has instead
effectuated "a wholesale overturning of settled law concerning the
Religion Clauses of our Constitution." 4
Although expressly recognizing that it will disadvantage less
common religious practices, 5 Justice Scalia nevertheless enunci-
ated, in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources
of Oregon v. Smith,' a startling and sweeping new standard,
designed to vitiate the free exercise clause of all meaning: "gener-
ally applicable, religion-neutral laws that have the effect of bur-
dening a particular religious practice need not be justified by a
compelling governmental interest. '7 Rather than enjoying a bicen-
tennial maturation, the fundamental right of free exercise of reli-
gion has instead been severely debilitated by the Court. The free
exercise rights of non-Christians have been rendered especially
tenuous by the Smith decision. Concomitantly, although presented
as an establishment clause case, the Court, in Westside Commu-
nity Schools v. Mergens,s dramatically endorsed the free exercise
Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990), stands
in glaring contrast to the line of cases that otherwise have protected free exercise of religion
primarily in the realm of unemployment: specifically, the right not to be excluded from the
receipt of unemployment compensation benefits when free exercise of religion results in loss
of employment. See Frazee v. Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 833-35 (1989) (Chris-
tian worker refusing job requiring him to work Sundays could not be denied unemployment
benefits under free exercise clause); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S.
136, 146 (1987) (Seventh-day Adventist discharged for refusing to work on sabbath could
not be denied unemployment compensation under free exercise clause); Thomas v. Review
Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 719-20 (1981) (Jehovah's Witness quitting employment because religious
beliefs prevented him from producing weapons entitled to unemployment benefits under
free exercise clause); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234-36 (1972) (Amish children freed
from state compulsory education law); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-06 (1963) (Sev-
enth-day Adventist need not agree to work on sabbath to be eligible for unemployment
benefits). However, in virtually all other cases in the modern history of the free exercise
clause, those asserting unconstitutional interference with free exercise rights have been un-
successful before the Supreme Court, dating from Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,
166-67 (1879), where the Court upheld the conviction of a Mormon for polygamy. See Lupu,
Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARv.
L. REV. 933, 938 (1989). It has been argued that "Reynolds drained the free exercise clause
of its primary constitutional function." Id.
' Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1616 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 1606.
6 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
Id. at 1604 n.3.
8 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990). There was a precursor to Mergens in the Supreme Court in
1986. In Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534 (1986), the Court avoided
making any decision on the merits. In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that a former school
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rights of Christian high school students to return organized group
prayer to the public schools. This Essay will assess the troubled
and bifurcated jurisprudence of religious liberty through the prism
of these important but disturbing decisions from the 1989 Term.
I. Westside Community Schools v. Mergens
In Mergens, the Court upheld the controversial Equal Access
Act (the "Act")." The Act permits student-initiated religious and
political groups to meet in public secondary schools during non-
instructional time on the same basis as any other student-organ-
ized noncurricular group.
In 1985, a group of Omaha high school students led by Bridget
Mergens, a senior at Westside High School, brought suit under the
Act against the Westside Community School District for its failure
to permit the group's members from organizing a student Christian
Bible study club. The district court in Nebraska upheld the school
board's denial of access. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit, however, reversed the trial court's decision, rea-
soning that the presence of noncurriculum related clubs at West-
side created a limited open forum triggering the Act. On appeal to
the Supreme Court, the school district raised two challenges:
whether Westside had become a limited open forum within the
meaning of the Act; and whether the Act violated the establish-
ment clause, if indeed a limited forum had been created.
Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor examined the history
of the Act. She pointed out that Congress explicitly intended the
Act to extend the reasoning of Widmar v. Vincent10 to secondary
schools. Accordingly, if a school creates a limited open forum by
permitting noncurriculum related groups to meet during non-in-
board member lacked standing to appeal a district court decision which recognized a stu-
dent religious group's right to hold prayer meetings on public school grounds during regular
school hours. Id. at 548-49. The Williamsport schools had a student activity period open to
any student club that contributed to the intellectual, physical, or social development of stu-
dents. Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 563 F. Supp. 697, 698 (M.D. Pa. 1983),
rev'd, 741 F.2d 538 (1986), vacated, 475 U.S. 534 (1986). The school board, however, denied
Petros, a Christian student prayer group, permission to meet. Id. at 701. It was the only club
so denied. Id. at 698. The Bender litigation commenced prior to the passage of the Equal
Access Act of 1984.
0 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (1988). The Act was signed into law by President Ronald W.
Reagan on August 11, 1984.
10 454 U.S. 263 (1981). In Widmar, the Court ruled that since the policy at a public
university had created a generally open forum, denying students equal access to buildings
for voluntary religious programs violated the right to free speech. Id. at 277.
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structional time, then it is obligated to grant equal access to a stu-
dent-sponsored Bible study club.
Although both sides agreed that Westside is a public second-
ary school receiving federal assistance within the meaning of the
Act, neither the Act nor its opaque legislative history provided a
definition of "noncurriculum related student groups." The Court's
preliminary task, therefore, involved statutory construction. A ma-
jority of the Justices agreed that since the Act's legislative purpose
was to end discrimination against religious speech in public
schools, a "noncurriculum related student group" is "best inter-
preted broadly to mean any student group that does not directly
relate to the body of courses offered by the school."'" Such an ap-
proach, the Court reasoned, is in accord with congressional intent
to provide a low threshold for triggering the Act. In reaching this
interpretation, the Court rejected the school district's argument
"that 'curriculum related' means anything remotely related to ab-
stract educational goals";' 2 to do so would virtually eviscerate the
Act.'3 The Court examined several of the noncurriculum related
groups at Westside and concluded that, through their presence, the
school had created a "limited open forum.' 4 The school board
could not therefore deny the prayer club access to the school's
facilities.
In addressing the core constitutional question-namely,
whether the Equal Access Act violates the establishment clause of
the first amendment-the Court splintered. 5 Writing for the plu-
11 Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2366 (emphasis in original). Even Justice Marshall, who did
not join generally in the Mergens opinion, concurred on this point. Id. at 2378 (Marshall, J.,
concurring). "I agree with the majority that 'noncurriculum' must be construed broadly to
'prohibit schools from discriminating on the basis of the content of a student group's
speech.'" Id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
12 Id. at 2369.
1" See id. The language of the Court here echoes that of Garnett v. Renton School Dist.,
No. 403, 865 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1989), vacated, 110 S. Ct. 2608 (1990). In Garnett, however,
the Ninth Circuit upheld the school district's refusal to allow a student organized religious
group to meet on a public high school campus prior to the start of the school day. Id. at
1128. The court reasoned that since the school in question had not created a limited open
forum, the Equal Access Act was not triggered. Id. at 1127-28.
"4 Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2369.
16 Id. at 2361. Although eight Justices voted to uphold the Equal Access Act, four dif-
ferent rationales were proffered. The plurality opinion was delivered by Justice O'Connor,
and was joined in Part I (facts) and Part II (statutory construction) by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justices White, Blackmun, Scalia, and Kennedy. Id. at 2362. Joining her in Part
III (establishment clause analysis) were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and
Blackmun. Id. at 2370. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia, concurred in part and
[Vol. 65:273
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rality, Justice O'Connor noted that in Widmar, the Court upheld
equal access under the test established in Lemon v. Kurtzman.'
She reasoned that an extension of the Court's logic and precedent
in Widmar should apply with equal force in Mergens. Conse-
quently, she embarked on separate analyses under each of the
three prongs of the Lemon test.17
First, Justice O'Connor found that the avowed purpose of the
Act, to prevent discrimination against religious as well as other
types of speech, satisfied the first prong of Lemon: it was undenia-
bly secular. Moreover, she asserted that even if some members of
Congress intended solely to protect religious speech, the Act must
be upheld; the Court must consider the legislative purpose of the
Act, not the subjective motives of the legislators.
Second, in a more detailed analysis, Justice O'Connor rejected
the school district's contention that the Act has the primary effect
of advancing religion. Perhaps in a play on the Lemon test itself,
Justice O'Connor engaged in three related analyses. First, she re-
jected the notion that a prayer club could result in a symbolic
union between government and religion in the minds of students.
She reasoned, somewhat naively, that high school students, compa-
rable to their counterparts in higher education, can readily distin-
guish a school's permitting a student prayer club on campus from
an official endorsement of prayer.18 While acknowledging the risk
concurred in the judgment. Id. at 2376. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, con-
curred in the judgment. Id. at 2378. Justice Stevens dissented. Id. at 2382.
Between the date that Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), was decided and the
start of the Court's Fall 1989 Term, no less than 27 cases, encompassing almost 100 different
opinions, have been handed down on the establishment of religion in and out of elementary
and secondary schools. There were but three unanimous rulings, and in two of those rulings
more than one opinion was filed; the third was a memorandum decision without opinion.
See Underwood, Establishment of Religion in Primary and Secondary Schools, 55 EDUC. L.
REP. 807, 809 n.7 (1989).
"8 See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270-75; see also Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. Under the
standard set forth in Lemon, a governmental policy will not violate the establishment clause
if it is motivated by a secular legislative purpose; if its principal impact is to neither pro-
mote nor restrain religion; and, finally, if the policy does not give rise to "excessive govern-
ment entanglement with religion." Id.
7 See supra note 16.
I" See Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2372. The position adopted by Justice O'Connor and the
plurality comports with the thinking of Congress, which relied on student testimony in its
assumption that students are mature enough to perceive religious neutrality. See S. REP.
No. 357, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1984). Congress also made reference to, and apparently was
influenced by, a Note in the Yale Law Journal, which asserts that high school students
possess enough maturity to perceive religious neutrality. See Note, The Constitutional
Dimensions of Student-Initiated Religious Activity in Public High Schools, 92 YALE L.J.
1991]
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of peer pressure, Justice O'Connor emphasized that because the
meetings were permitted only during noninstructional time, partic-
ipation by school officials at prayer club meetings could not create
the impression of official endorsement. She next asserted that if a
school clarifies that a prayer club's presence on campus is solely in
acquiescence to a student's request, then other students cannot
reasonably infer any endorsement of the club.'9 Finally, she ex-
plained that since the prayer club was only one of a wide variety of
student-initiated voluntary clubs, students should not perceive it
as an official endorsement. Justice O'Connor thus concluded that
the Act, both on its face and as applied in Mergens, did not have
the primary effect of advancing religion.2
In considering the final prong of the Lemon test, Justice
O'Connor refused to recognize excessive entanglement between the
school and the religious club. She stressed that, although the Act
does permit a school to assign supervisory personnel to ensure
proper student behavior, it more significantly prohibits any moni-
toring, participation, or involvement by faculty, nonschool person-
nel (such as ministers), as well as school sponsorship of the meet-
ings. In fact, she cautioned that any attempt to deny equal access
might create a greater specter of excessive entanglement through
the invasive machinery necessary to safeguard against religious
speech.2
In a brief concurrence, Justice Kennedy agreed that the Act
did not violate the establishment clause, although he would not
have employed the Lemon test. Rather, he analyzed whether the
Act either gave such a direct benefit to a religion that it verged on
establishing a state religion, or so coerced student participation in
499, 507-09 (1983). However, at least one empirical study casts doubt on the ability of high
school students to perceive religious neutrality. See Rossow & Rossow, High School Prayer
Clubs: Can Students Perceive Religious Neutrality?, 45 EDUC. L. REP. 475, 476-83 (1988)
(psychological data supports notion that high school students cannot perceive neutrality). In
addition, a number of psychological studies indicate both that peers exercise a great deal of
influence in high school and that levels of maturity among adolescents may vary greatly.
See, e.g., Brittain, Adolescent Choices and Parent-Peer Cross-Pressures, 28 AM. Soc. REV.
385, 390-91 (1963) (although adolescents confronted with parent-peer cross-pressures gener-
ally opt towards peer group, tendencies vary greatly with type of choice to be made); Las-
seigne, A Study of Peer and Adult Influence on Moral Beliefs of Adolescents, 10 ADOLES-
CENCE 227, 228-30 (1975) (studies demonstrate moral beliefs of adolescents increasingly
influenced by peer groups and decreasingly influenced by parent pressure).
19 Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2372.




religious activity that it infringed on free exercise. Because Justice
Kennedy perceived neither violation, he therefore would have up-
held the constitutionality of the Act without the Lemon analysis.22
In a lengthier concurrence, Justice Marshall stated that the
Act could withstand establishment clause scrutiny. However, he
was concerned that schools take special care to avoid creating even
the appearance of endorsing the goals of a prayer club. He offered
suggestions on how schools such as Westside could avoid this
situation.2"
In many quarters, prayers seemingly have been answered;24 in
Mergens, the Court endorsed the constitutionality of the Equal
Access Act of 1984,25 and, with it, the successful effort by Congress
and the Reagan-Bush administration to return organized vocal stu-
dent prayer to public secondary schools. 26 The public hysteria and
22 See Id. at 2376-78 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
23 See Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2382-83 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall main-
tained that nonendorsement requires schools to disassociate themselves from any religious
speech, perhaps including an affirmative discouragement of student participation in any
club activity. Id.
2' Ruling Adds Zeal to Bible Students' Crusade, N.Y. Times, June 11, 1990, at Al,
col. 1.
25 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (1988). For extensive commentary on the Equal Access Act,
see generally Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Reli-
gious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U.L. REv. 1 passim (1986) (defending Act as
consistent with need for absolute governmental neutrality towards religion and private
speech); Stone, The Equal Access Controversy: The Religion Clauses and the Meaning of
"Neutrality", 81 Nw. U.L. REv. 168, 172-73 (1986) (calling for less stringent substantial
state interest test in equal access cases) Strossen, A Framework for Evaluating Equal Ac-
cess Claims by Student Religious Groups: Is There a Window for Free-Speech in the Wall
Separating Church and State?, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 143 passim (1985) (Act serves as actual
or implicit endorsement of religion); Teitel, When Separate Is Equal: Why Organized Reli-
gious Exercises, Unlike Chess, Do Not Belong in the Public Schools, 81 Nw. U.L. REv. 174
passim (1986) (arguing equal access provides governmental assistance to propagation of reli-
gion, and terming Professor Laycock's view "accomodationist"); Whitehead, Avoiding Reli-
gious Apartheid: Affording Equal Treatment For Student-Initiated Religious Expression
In Public Schools, 16 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 229 passim (1989) (accommodation of religion has
constitutional and historical roots); see also Note, Student Religious Groups and the Right
of Access to Public School Activity Periods, 74 GEo. L.J. 205 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Stu-
dent Religious Groups] (extensive inquiry into public forum creation and stressing its im-
portance as threshold issue in any equal access analysis); Note, The Equal Access Act: The
Establishment Clause v. The Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses, 33 N.Y.L. ScH. L.
REv. 447 passim (1988) (Act should not survive establishment clause analysis because its
underlying purpose is to encourage religion).
2" See Note, Student Religious Groups, supra note 25, at 206 (Act "might accomplish
what no other approach by religious groups has achieved-the authorization of prayer in
public schools").
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gross misperceptions surrounding the school prayer 27 and Bible
reading28 decisions by the Court almost thirty years ago had fes-
tered through the controversial moment-of-silence case 29 of the
past decade.
But in fact, as constitutional lawyers know, the Court never
banished the Bible or prayer per se from public school. The War-
ren Court prohibited scripture readings and prayer when they were
officially sponsored as part of the school regime by public school
leadership; these government-sponsored actions are violations of
the establishment clause. But, as the Court took pains to explain
in those cases, the Bible could continue to be taught for compara-
tive religion or literature classes, and students could continue to
pray silently and individually in public schools. Of course, this
frustrated those students and teachers (as well as parents and poli-
ticians) who wished to pray vocally and communally in public
school. Wallace v. Jaffree,30 which struck down Alabama's mo-
ment-of-silence statute in 1985, capped over two decades of vehe-
ment public outrage directed against the Court by those who advo-
cated the return of organized vocal student prayer to public
schools.
Facially, therefore, the Mergens decision ought to be cause for
great rejoicing. The practical realities of Mergens, however, suggest
that the decision ultimately may bitterly disappoint its current
champions. Those now delighted with the return of organized vocal
student prayer to public schools may come to rue Mergens and to
yearn for a return to the contemplative quiet of the Abington
School District v. Schempp31 era. The age-old caution is once
again proven true: Beware, lest your prayers be answered-or, at
least, be certain of what you pray for!
The successful students at the Westside High School in
27 See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 436 (1962) (New York Board of Regents' nonde-
nominational prayer, which local school board ordered recited daily, violated establishment
clause).
28 See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (Pennsylvania law
requiring daily reading without comment of ten Bible verses violated establishment clause,
even though children could be excused upon written parental request).
2 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); see Comment, School Prayer and the Consti-
tution: Silence is Golden, 48 MD. L. REv. 1018, 1030-43 (1989) (assessing potential impact of
Jaffree on existing moment of silence statutes).
30 472 U.S. 38 (1985). The Court held that because the state legislature expressly
designed the statute to encourage prayer it violated the establishment clause. Id. at 56-61.
31 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
[Vol. 65:273
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Omaha, Nebraska were Christians. The salient immediate chal-
lenge is this: Will those now rejoicing over Mergens encourage its
inevitable extension to protect student religious groups that are
not mainstream Christian? If other student religious groups-for
example, Muslims, Jews, or Buddhists-utilize Mergens, as they
surely will, public high schools may become cacophonous discor-
dant towers of Babel. And, if Christian proponents of Mergens find
disconcerting the prospects of opening up schools to other main-
stream religions, imagine what contretemps await Mergens initia-
tives by New Age devotees, Satanists, and religious racists.
Those school prayer champions who naively insist that
America is a tolerant, ecumenical, and pluralistic society that will
be able to thrive on Mergens are sadly mistaken. One need look
neither far nor long to see the pernicious ramifications of Mergens.
This nation has never met the full challenge and promise of the
Bill of Rights. For instance, the bitter counterpoint to Mergens
also lies in the same October 1989 Term of the Supreme Court, in
a profoundly unsettling decision rendered only six weeks earlier.
II. Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of
Oregon v. Smith3 2
Alfred Smith and Galen Black, members of the Native Ameri-
can Church, were drug and alcohol counselors at the Douglas
County Council on Alcohol and Drug Abuse, a private, nonprofit
rehabilitation center in Oregon. After ingesting peyote during a re-
ligious ceremony of their church,3 3 they were, consistent with their
32 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
" For a discussion of Native American sacramental use of peyote, see Nelson, Native
American Religious Freedom and the Peyote Sacrament: The Precarious Balance Between
State Interests and the Free Exercise Clause, 31 ARiz. L. REv. 423, 424-25 (1989).
[P]eyote has been accepted by thousands of Indians as the central element in the
vibrant religious movement legally organized as the Native American Church. Pe-
yote's principal ingredient is mescaline. When taken internally peyote produces a
hallucinogenic effect. Church members consume peyote at "meetings" designed to
give thanks for past good fortune or to find guidance for future conduct. Many
users experience a heightened sense of comprehension and good feeling towards
other people, coupled with extraordinary visions in which colors or animals are
often seen. More importantly, peyote itself constitutes an object of worship for
Native American Church members. Prayers are directed to peyote in much the
same manner as some Christians pray to the Holy Ghost. Members regard peyote
as a teacher which enables the participant to experience the Deity. Members also
view peyote as a protector and often carry it in a beaded pouch for such purposes.
Finally, the Native American Church strictly forbids the use of peyote for nonreli-
1991]
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employer's policy, fired from their jobs. Because Oregon's penal
law renders peyote a criminally prohibited drug, the state's Em-
ployment Division could deny unemployment compensation bene-
fits to persons dismissed from their jobs due to their religiously
inspired use of peyote. However, the state agency denied unem-
ployment benefits to Smith and Black based on their termination
for work-related misconduct, rather than for any violation of Ore-
gon's criminal drug statutes.
The Oregon Court of Appeals, basing its judgment on the free
exercise clause, reversed the agency's decision, but was, in turn,
reversed by the Oregon Supreme Court. The United States Su-
preme Court vacated and remanded the state high court's ruling.
On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court ruled against the unem-
ployment claim on the ground that the sacramental use of peyote
had violated, and was not exempt from, the prohibition of the drug
under state penal law. However, since it also ruled that the prohi-
bition was invalid under the free exercise clause, it found that the
unemployment benefits could not be denied. On appeal once again,
the Court neatly framed the issue as whether the prohibition of the
religious use of peyote is permissible under the free exercise clause.
Writing for a divided Court,34 Justice Scalia began his analysis
with an examination of the meaning of free exercise. He defined
the free exercise of religion as "the right to believe and profess
whatever religious doctrine one desires." 5 This involves not only
belief and profession, but also the performance of, or abstention
from, a variety of acts including participation in liturgical services
and adherence to dietary laws. Despite his lip service acknowledg-
ment of conduct associated with free exercise, Justice Scalia later
interpreted such precedent as Wisconsin v. Yoder3" to be at odds
with both the concurrence and dissent, and displayed little regard
for the Court's traditional understanding of conduct in free exer-
cise cases.
gious purposes, considering such use sacrilegious.
Id. at 424 (footnotes omitted).
14 Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1597. Joining in Justice Scalia's opinion were Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices White, Stevens, and Kennedy. Id. Justice O'Connor concurred in
the judgment of the Court but did not join in its opinion. Id. at 1606. Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun joined in Parts I and II of Justice O'Connor's opinion, but did not
join in the judgment of the Court. Id. Rather, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan
and Marshall, dissented. Id. at 1615.
31 Id. at 1599.
36 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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Faced with Smith and Black's claim that would, in his mind,
carry free exercise one "large step further," Justice Scalia rejected
the notion that an individual's free exercise rights should place one
beyond the reach of a criminal law not specifically directed at one's
religious practices. 37 Citing a number of earlier Supreme Court rul-
ings, he argued that the Court never held that an individual's reli-
gious beliefs or practices relieved one of the duty to comply with a
law prohibiting conduct that the state was free to regulate.3 8
The only cases, Justice Scalia contended, in which the Court
found that the first amendment prohibits the application of a
facially neutral statute are those in which the free exercise clause
is interpreted in conjunction with other constitutionally protected
rights such as freedom of speech or press, or the right of parents to
direct the education of their children. 9 In Smith, by contrast, he
found no such hybrid amalgamation of affected rights because
Smith and Black did not contend that they presented anything
"but a free exercise claim unconnected with any communicative
activity or parental right. '40 Consequently, the Court was not
about to hold that when an act subject to government regulation is
accompanied by a religious conviction, both the belief and the con-
duct are free from regulation.
Turning to the second half of his rationale, Justice Scalia as-
sessed the appropriate standard of review for a free exercise case.
Smith and Black argued that even if their use of peyote was not
automatically exempt from the generally applicable criminal stat-
ute, their claim for a religious exemption should at least be judged
under the balancing test enunciated in Sherbert v. Verner.41 In
Sherbert, the Court ruled that any governmental actions that sub-
stantially infringe upon the free exercise of an individual's religion
must be justified by a compelling governmental interest.42
Justice Scalia rejected the use of Sherbert, noting that the
Court had, in recent years, refrained from applying it outside of
unemployment compensation cases. Even if the Court were to ex-
pand the use of Sherbert, he indicated that it should not be ap-
plied to allow exceptions from generally applicable criminal laws.
37 Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1599.
11 Id. at 1600.
30 Id. at 1601-02.
40 Id. at 1602.
41 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
42 Id. at 403.
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Moreover, he contended that even when applied in free exercise
cases, Sherbert had never been used to strike down an otherwise
valid statute. Thus, he found that "the sounder approach, and the
approach in accord with the vast majority of our precedents, is to
hold the test inapplicable to such [free exercise] challenges. '43
Although Justice Scalia noted that the compelling interest test
urged by Smith and Black appeared benign, he was inordinately
concerned that its familiarity in producing "constitutional norms"
in free speech and racial equality cases would be misplaced in free
exercise cases. 44 He feared that free exercise's marked difference
from free speech and racial equality would produce "a private right
to ignore generally applicable laws"-a "constitutional anomaly. '45
Moreover, he voiced concern over the Court establishing the com-
pelling interest test as the standard in free exercise cases because
it might force a judge to determine inappropriately the significance
of a particular religious tenet before deciding whether the test is
applicable.46
Justice Scalia further reasoned that if the compelling interest
test were to be applied in free exercise cases, then it must be ap-
plied to all actions considered religiously motivated; such a deci-
sion would, perhaps unwittingly, open the door to greater govern-
mental regulation in the private lives of individuals. In a reduction
to the absurd, he cautioned that the uniform application of the
compelling interest test could open the door to religious exemp-
tions from a wide variety of civic obligations, including military
service, health and safety regulations (particularly child neglect
laws),47 and traffic laws. Justice O'Connor, however, sharply re-
" Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1603.
" Id. at 1604.
11 Id. Justice O'Connor took strong exception to Justice Scalia's use of the term "con-
stitutional anomaly." Id. at 1612 (O'Connor, J., concurring). She responded that "the First
Amendment unequivocally makes freedom of religion, like.., freedom of speech, a 'consti-
tutional nor[m],' not an 'anomaly.'" Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun also
had great difficulty with Justice Scalia's use of the term. Id. at 1616 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
"e Id. at 1604.
" Justice Scalia's alarmist fears over the introduction of potentially large-scale religious
exemptions from child neglect laws should be allayed by a report in Newsday detailing the
criminal conviction of Christian Science parents in connection with the death of their two-
year-old son. Newsday, July 5, 1990, at 3, col. 1; see also N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1990, at Al,
col. 2 (Christian Science couple that relied on prayer to cure young son with obstructed
bowel convicted of involuntary manslaughter). A related story recounts the cases of six other
Christian Science couples who faced legal action over the death of their children since April
of 1989: three were convicted of criminal violations ranging from murder to child endanger-
[Vol. 65:273
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sponded to this threatened "parade of horribles." In her yiew, the
cases relied on by the majority merely emphasize the Court's abil-
ity to strike consistently a sensible balance between the free exer-
cise of religion and compelling state interests.48
Justice Scalia finally noted that states are permitted, but not
required, to respond to the significance of free exercise claims by
using the political processes to make accommodations for such re-
ligiously motivated acts as the sacramental use of peyote. 4 How-
ever, his vague reference that "several" states permit the sacra-
mental use of peyote reflects a casuistry in jarring contrast to the
dissent's observation that twenty-three states and the federal gov-
ernment have created such exceptions.50 Nonetheless, Justice
Scalia concluded that since Oregon's prohibition of the use of pe-
yote does not violate the free exercise clause, the state was justified
in denying unemployment compensation to Smith and Black. The
Court thus reversed the ruling of the Oregon Supreme Court.
In a three part concurrence, whose first two sections were
joined by the dissent, Justice O'Connor took the Court to task for
its analysis of the doctrine of free exercise. She convincingly
demonstrated the need to balance free exercise claims against the
government's interest in enforcing the law. Hence, she would have
employed the compelling interest test in a case by case analysis to
determine whether the burden imposed by a particular facially
neutral criminal law is constitutionally significant and, if so,
whether its enforcement can be justified by a compelling state in-
terest. However, in applying the test, she parted company with the
dissent; she reasoned, not unlike the Court, that Oregon had a
compelling interest in prohibiting the possession or use of peyote
by its citizens.
Justice Blackmun, dissenting, would have applied the compel-
ling interest standard to a different result. He presented a cogent
and well-reasoned defense of an exemption permitting the contin-
ued use of peyote by members of the Native American Church.
Unfortunately, Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court charted dan-
ment, one entered a plea bargain, another was acquitted, and the final couple had its case
dismissed on the basis of a state law (Minnesota) which permits parents to depend on
prayer for health care. See Newsday, July 5, 1990, at 37, col. 1; N.Y. Times, July 5, 1990, at
A12, col. 3.
48 Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1613 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
49 Id. at 1606.
60 Id. at 1618 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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gerous new ground for free exercise cases.
III. CRITIQUE AND CONCLUSION
Smith reflects the incredible cultural imperialism, arrogance,
and hostility of the Court toward the free exercise rights of indige-
nous people.51 The answer to Mergens lies in Smith. Unless and
until the dominant Christian mainstream fully respects the reli-
gious liberty of Native Americans, every person's fundamental first
amendment right of free exercise of religion will remain a whited
sepulchre.52
5, Throughout this Essay, the terms Indian, Native, and indigenous will be used inter-
changeably to refer to Native American Indian indigenous people. All of these terms are
imperfect derivatives of dominant foreign linguistic and cultural imperatives; in this milieu,
it seems pointless to quibble over the degree of "political correctness" of an essentially for-
eign terminology. Christopher Columbus mistakenly believed that he had reached India;
hence, the term "Indians." "Native American" has more coherence, but it is an ironic term
for nomadic cultures. The Native American Church, however, is the official title of an organ-
ized religious movement, and has approximately 300,000 members. See Nelson, supra note
33, at 424 n.4 (citing Kennedy v. Bureau of Narcotic & Dangerous Drugs, 459 F.2d 415, 416
(9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1115 (1973)).
S2 Smith is the direct descendant of the Court's outrageous decision in Lyng v. North-
west Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). In Lyng, a 5-3 decision written
by Justice O'Connor, the Court held that the free exercise clause did not bar the federal
government from building a six-mile-long road through the heart of Indian religious grounds
in a national forest, even though building the road "could have devastating effects on tradi-
tional Indian religious practices." Id. at 451. Justice O'Connor was utterly oblivious to the
fact that the religious site in the national forest originally belonged to the Indians and had
been, "treaty" euphemisms aside, stolen, as was all of America, from its original inhabitants.
"Whatever rights the Indians may have to the use of the area, however, those rights do not
divest the Government of its right to use what is, after all, its land." Id. at 453 (emphasis in
original). In his dissent, Justice Brennan observed that the federal government's construc-
tion of the road would "virtually destroy a religion." Id. at 472 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Lyng completely vitiated the American Indian Religious Freedom Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1996
(1988).
Lyng, in turn, is the direct descendant of the Court's pernicious decision in Bowen v.
Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986). In Bowen, the Court found that certain Abenaki Indian parents
were not entitled to government benefits of food stamps or aid to families with dependent
children, because they failed to follow government requirements and did not obtain a social
security number for their minor daughter, Little Bird of the Snow. Id. at 696. The Indians
sincerely believed that the social security number would harm the child's spirit and deplete
her spiritual power. Id. at 697. Rejecting the Indians' claim for government benefits due to
the deliberate absence of the child's social security number, Chief Justice Burger stated:
The Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require the Government
to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious beliefs
of particular citizens.
... Roy may no more prevail on his religious objection to the Government's
use of a Social Security number for his daughter than he could on a sincere reli-
gious objection to the size or color of the Government's filing cabinets.
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The most insightful lessons in the troubled jurisprudence of
religious liberty can be taught by examining the harsh history of
native people. The bicentennial of the Bill of Rights coincides with
an earlier centennial moment in American history, one especially
washed in innocent blood. The massacre by the United States
Army of three hundred starving Sioux men, and unarmed women
and children at Wounded Knee, South Dakota occurred in late De-
cember of 1890.11
Of course, Smith does not rise to the level of Wounded Knee.
It is significant, however, that the Sioux Ghost Dancers were
slaughtered while messianically enraptured in their own last des-
perate free exercise of religion. 4 In this tragic and bloody history,
Smith is but the most recent instance of cultural genocide. 55
Id. at 699-700.
The Court's trivialization of Indian free exercise rights summed up the view of the "Im-
perial Court": Indian sacred sites are intrusions on the government's land, suffered solely at
the government's pleasure and whim. An Indian's right to practice religion and to live with
dignity are relegated to acquiescence, seemingly even to the government's office furniture
decor.
Lyng, understandably, has been the target of well-deserved, scathing criticism. "The
Lyng decision reeks of injustice." Comment, The Scope of the Free Exercise Clause: Lyng
v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 68 N.C.L. REv. 410, 421 (1990); see
Note, Unjustified Interference of American Indian Religious Rights: Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 22 CREIGHTON L. REv. 313, 326-31 (1988) (Court
suddenly abandoned traditional balancing test and allowed fundamental liberty to be de-
stroyed); Note, Constitutional Law-First Amendment-Government Action Does Not Vi-
olate Free Exercise Clause of First Amendment When It Neither Coerces Action Contrary
to Religious Beliefs Nor Prohibits Access to Practice Those Beliefs, But Merely Imposes an
Incidental Burden on Religious Practice, 20 ST. MARY'S L.J. 427, 450 (1989) (more sensitive
approach would inquire into sincerity of belief, and centrality of practice to particular reli-
gion); see also Comment, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association: Gov-
ernment Property Rights and the Free Speech Clause, 16 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 483, 484-85
(1989) (Court's traditional concern for indirect effects of government action on religious vi-
tality inexplicably abandoned in Lyng); Comment, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery As-
sociation: A Form-Over-Effect Standard for the Free Exercise Clause, 20 Loy. U. Cm. L.J.
171, 187-90 (1988) (Lyng court abandoned precedent and ignored effect of government ac-
tion); Comment, The Sacred Public Lands: Improper Line Drawing in the Supreme Court's
Free Exercise Analysis, 60 U. COLO. L. REv. 601, 657 (1989) (as result of Lyng, Western
religions "protected from even relatively minor burdens ... while American Indians are not
protected from government actions that essentially destroy entire religious traditions").
83 D. BROWN, BURY My HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE 413-18 (1970).
" See id. at 391, 406-16 (discussion of Ghost Dancing religion); see also J. NEWHARDT,
BLACK ELK SPEAKS 241-51 (1932) (same).
Il "Genocide" is an ugly historical reality. We use the term deliberately. It is a "new
word for an old tragedy .... Policies of the Spanish, French, English, and the United States
may have reduced the population of the new world by as many as 25 million. Genocide is
the modern word for a long historic experience which is no stranger to the American conti-
nent." Strickland, Genocide-At-Law: An Historic and Contemporary View of the Native
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Mergens and Smith reflect the unprincipled dichotomy be-
tween the free exercise rights of the Christian mainstream and the
virtually nonexistent free exercise rights of all others. "[T]he law
that has emerged thus far creates an intolerable risk of discrimina-
tion against unconventional religious practices and beliefs, and
threatens to narrow the protection of religious liberty overall." '
This is especially intolerable when the legalistic minuet that
has afflicted the jurisprudence of establishment and free exercise
may finally be exhausted. The formalistic weaving of the multipart
Lemon test, with its attendant rubric and ritual, is torn and
frayed, perhaps beyond repair.57 The tension between the estab-
American Experience, 34 U. KAN. L. REv. 713, 713-14 (1986); see also Ball, The Unfree
Exercise of Religion, 20 CAP. U.L. REv. 41, 51 (1991) (Smith "is one of a series of opinions
in which the Court has carried out aggression against Indian religion").
Cultural genocide, while not nearly as dramatic or as tragic as literal genocide, still has
a plethora of pernicious manifestations in dominant Anglo culture. Consider but one exam-
ple: At St. John's University, the academic base and the alma mater, respectively, of the
authors of this Article, the "Redman" remains the de facto symbol of the St. John's Univer-
sity student athletic teams, even to the extent that the peculiar "Lady Redmen"
("Redwomen"? "Redpersons"?) appellation was used until recently. The women's basket-
ball team is currently called the "Express." Recently, much to the consternation of most
non-Native American fans, students, athletes, and graduates, the large papier machg
"Redman" team "mascot" (an idiotic exaggerated caricature of a bellicose Indian warrior,
inspiring non-Indian fans to war-whoops) was finally officially repudiated by the University.
There are obvious risks in engaging in this particular form of scholarship and in assert-
ing one's own Native American Indian heritage at an institution with this history. See Greg-
ory, Incremental Progress: A Study of American Indian Law (Book Review), 1987 Wisc. L.
REv. 493 (reviewing C. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW (1987)). Yet there
is cause for hope. At the multi-cultural university that St. John's aspires officially to be-
come, things have "progressed" to the extent that a senior university executive recently,
solicited one of the authors' views on the appropriation of the term "Cherokee" for one of
its automotive products.
56 Lupu, supra note 3, at 936.
5 Persuasive criticism of Lemon has emerged. "I am content for present purposes to
remain within the Lemon framework, but do not wish to be seen as advocating, let alone
adopting, that test as our primary guide in this difficult area." Allegheny County v. ACLU,
109 S. Ct. 3086, 3134 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part); see also Edwards v. Aguillard,
482 U.S. 578, 636-40 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Lemon's purpose test requires guesswork
by courts); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 426-30 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (current
Lemon analysis greatly exaggerates danger of undue entanglement between church and
state); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 108-13 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (Lemon test
"has simply not provided adequate standards for deciding Establishment Clause cases").
Justice O'Connor had earlier proposed a refined Lemon test, focusing on whether the chal-
lenged government action is intended or perceived to convey government endorsement or
approval of religion. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690-94 (1984).
Perhaps a substantial revision of our Establishment Clause doctrine is now in order.
Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 768-69 (1976) (White, J., concurring);
see also Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 110 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Lemon test has caused this
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lishment and free exercise clauses s is lessening.5 Perhaps even the
Court to fracture into unworkable plurality opinions"); Committee for Public Educ. & Reli-
gious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980) ("Establishment Clause cases are not easy
• * and we are divided among ourselves"); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614 (church-state separation
"far from being a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct and variable barrier").
Criticism of Lemon has not been confined to the courts. See Esbeck, The Lemon Test:
Should It Be Retained, Reformulated, Or Rejected?, 4 NOTRE DAm J. L. ETHICS & PuB.
POL'Y 513, 543-48 (1990) (proposes supplanting Lemon altogether); Redlich, Separation of
Church and State: The Burger Court's Tortuous Journey, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1094,
1107 (1985) (Lemon test breaks down into three separate tests which often neglect broader
implications of government policies). But see Lynch, 465 U.S. at 713 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (Court's relaxed application of Lemon regrettable); Recent Developments, The Lemon
Test Soured: The Supreme Court's New Establishment Clause Analysis, 37 VAND. L. REv.
1175, 1201-03 (1984) (Court should reaffirm commitment to Lemon test and apply it
strictly).
11 Professor Laurence Tribe has noted the inherent conflict between the two clauses:
[S]erious tension has often surfaced between the two clauses .... A pervasive
difficulty in the constitutional jurisprudence of the religion clauses has accordingly
been the struggle "to find a neutral course between the two Religion Clauses, both
of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical
extreme, would tend to clash with the other."
L. TamE, AmRICAN CONSTrurTioNAL LAW 1157 (2d ed. 1988) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970)). However, Professor McConnell has suggested that the Court's
separate construction of the two clauses has exacerbated the tension.
No one would suggest that the Justices have created the religion clauses muddle
because they are unintelligent, or because they have devoted insufficient attention
to the problem. Rather, there has been a fundamental mistake at the most basic
level about the relationship between the free exercise and establishment clauses.
The mistake arose, historically, from looking at the two clauses in isolation and
giving them a different cast. Since then, the Court has worked out the logical im-
plications of the divergent interpretations, to the point that today the clauses are
read as if they meant opposite things-not simply that there is a "tension" be-
tween free exercise and establishment, which the Court has frequently stated, but
that the two clauses of the first amendment are essentially at war with one
another.
This is more than evidence of tension between the clauses. What the free
exercise clause requires the establishment clause forbids, and vice versa. This
helps to explain the Court's doctrinal confusion: it is using legal constructs that
are internally inconsistent.
McConnell, The Religion Clause of the First Amendment: Where is the Supreme Court
Heading?, 32 CATH. LAW. 187, 195-97 (1989); see also Blackmun, The First Amendment and
Its Religion Clauses: Where Are We? Where Are We Going?, 14 NOVA L. REv. 29, 32-33
(1989) (two fundamental, often conflicting, characteristics underlie first amendment: volun-
tarism and separatism); Hatch, Foreword: The Tension Between the Free Exercise Clause
and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, 47 OHIo ST. L.J. 291, 291 (1986)
("idea of ... tension existing between the two clauses is sound").
" Professor Tribe has proposed a unitary reading of the first amendment religion
clauses to promote both church-state separatism and participatory voluntarism, with the
latter principle prevailing whenever there is a conflict, and with free exercise prevailing in
conflicts with the establishment clause. L. TRIBE, supra note 58, at 1160-62, 1201. In a dis-
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intricate, elaborate divisions of the separatist,6  neutral,6 ' nonpref-
senting opinion, Justice Rutledge dismissed the tension as a false dichotomy: "'Establish-
ment' and 'free exercise' were correlative and coextensive ideas, representing only different
facets of the single great and fundamental freedom." Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,
40 (1947). More recently, Justice Scalia has asserted that the clauses are not inherently
conflictual. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 38 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(no need to walk tightrope between clauses). His sentiments echo those of Justice
Rehnquist.
By broadly construing both Clauses, the Court has constantly narrowed the chan-
nel between the Scylla and Charybdis through which any state or federal action
must pass in order to survive constitutional scrutiny.
[Any tension between the clauses] is largely of [the Supreme Court's] own
making, and would diminish almost to the vanishing point if the Clauses were
properly interpreted.
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 721-22 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also
Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 83 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (solution to conflict between clauses lies
"not in 'neutrality,' but rather in identifying workable limits to the government's license to
promote the free exercise of religion"); Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification
of the Religion Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REV. 233 passim (1988) (effective limits on government
action requires development of legally functional definition of religion); Paulsen, Religion,
Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause
Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 313 (1986) (religion clauses merely "address a
single, central value from two different angles"); Ward, Reconceptualizing Establishment
Clause Cases as Free Exercise Class Actions, 98 YALE L.J. 1739 passim (1989) (reconceptu-
alizing establishment clause suits as free exercise class actions will bring sharper focus on
clauses' key underlying concern: protecting religious liberty). But see Marshall, The Case
Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
357, 411-12 (1990) (Court's current approach creates false dichotomy between secular and
religious belief systems; by preferring latter it also "offends the equality-of-ideas notion...
at core of constitutional law").
60 L. TRIBE, supra note 57, at 1161.
[Separatism] calls for much more than the institutional separation of church and
state; it means that the state should not become involved in religious affairs or
derive its claim to authority from religious sources, that religious bodies should
not be granted governmental powers, and-perhaps-that sectarian differences
should not be allowed unduly to fragment the body politic.
Id. Professor Esbeck has divided separatists into "secularists" (who believe the Establish-
ment Clause takes precedence over the right of free speech) and the "institu-
tional-separatists." See Esbeck, Religion and a Neutral State: Imperative or Impossibil-
ity?, 15 CUMB. L. REV. 67, 75-77 (1984).
61 In the relationship between humanity and religion, "the State is firmly committed to
a position of neutrality." Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963). Pro-
fessor Tribe, however, has characterized neutrality as an "elusive and variable notion." L.
TRIBE, supra note 58, at 1167. Neutrality flows from, but is distinct from, strict separatism.
Id. at 1188-1201. Professor Kurland has been the primary proponent of a strict neutrality
that is closely related to separatism.
The freedom and separation clauses should be read as stating a single precept:
that government cannot utilize religion as a standard for action or inaction be-
cause these clauses, read together as they should be, prohibit classification in
terms of religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a burden.
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erential,62 and accommodationist s camps of warring theoreticians
Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CH. L. REV. 1, 96 (1961).
Professor Laycock, however, is a primary proponent of a neutrality or nonpreferentialism
that is much closer to accommodation.
Defining neutrality in all the varied interactions between church and state is a
major task for religion clause scholarship. I do not mean neutrality in the sense of
a ban on religious classifications. Instead, I mean neutrality in the sense of govern-
ment conduct that insofar as possible neither encourages nor discourages religious
belief or practice.... The government must be neutral both in its own speech
and in its treatment of private speech. It may not take a position on questions or
religion in its own speech, and it must treat religious speech by private speakers
exactly like secular speech by private speakers.
Laycock, supra note 25, at 3 (footnotes omitted); see also McConnell, Neutrality Under the
Religion Clauses, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 146 passim (1986) (strict neutrality approach may not
exhaust all protections of religious liberty Constitution was intended to provide); Valauri,
The Concept of Neutrality in Establishment Clause Doctrine, 48 U. PiTr. L. REV. 83 pas-
sim (1986) (concept of neutrality too complex and ambiguous to be applied in principled
substantive fashion).
'2 Professor Veltri has vigorously criticized the Court's nonpreferential approach:
In recent years, a particular favorite in the search for a replacement [for Lemon's
three-part test] has been the nonpreferentialist approach to the establishment
clause . . . . Under the nonpreferentialist approach, the establishment clause
would be interpreted to permit public funding of the secular activities of religious
groups, such as education, provided the government did not show preference to
the activities of any particular sect or denomination. . . . At the core of the non-
preferentialist thesis lies an historical understanding of the original intent of the
establishment clause; nonpreferentialists invariably cite historical examples from
the early national period when both state and federal governments aided the ac-
tivities of various religious denominations.
Veltri, Nativism And Nonpreferentialism: A Historical Critique of the Current Church and
State Theme, 13 U. DAYTON L. REV. 229, 230-31 (1988). But see Smith, Nonpreferentialism,
supra note 2 (although framers did not specifically intend to adopt nonpreferentialist view,
theory retains historical legitimacy and underlies much modern case law).
'3 Chief Justice Rehnquist is the Court's most prominent advocate of accommodation.
He would have upheld the moment-of-silence law in Wallace v. Jaffree because the law
"affirmatively furthers the values of religious freedom and tolerance .... [I]t accommodates
the purely private, voluntary religious choices of the individual pupils who wish to pray
while at the same time creating a time for nonreligious reflection for those who do not
choose to pray." Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 89 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
The primary academic advocate of accommodation is Professor McConnell.
The accommodationist option... offers the possibility of a unified theory of reli-
gious choice. The two religion clauses can be understood as complementary provi-
sions guaranteeing that government action be conducted, as much as possible, so
as to reduce effects on religious choice. .
To return to this constitutional vision requires a reorientation of first amend-
ment doctrine, away from secularism and separation, and toward religious choice
as a unified interpretation of both free exercise and establishment. If one has any
faith in the persuasive power of the constitutional vision, this must be the direc-
tion the Supreme Court is heading-if not now, then some day.
McConnell, supra note 58, at 198, 201-02. McConnell, however, sharply disassociated his
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may eventually dissipate, although probably not before thousands
of additional pages in law reviews have contributed to the cause. 4
At this bicentennial, the hard-pressed separatist position is in
retreat. Separatism, increasingly considered a modern aberration,s"
approach from anything remotely resembling neutrality.
If perfect neutrality is what we want, we must eliminate public schools. The best
we can do... is to foster pluralism and diversity .... That is not the same thing
as secularism. But neither is it necessarily the same thing as neutrality. It requires
the public schools to seek out ways to make room for religious elements by means
that do not compel religious observances by students who are unwilling or indif-
ferent ..
Neutrality often, indeed usually, serves the cause of religious liberty; but
when it does not, a proper appreciation for the needs of religious practitioners
requires something more.
McConnell, supra note 59, at 165-167; see McConnell, supra note 1, at 1513-16 (protecting
smaller religious factions and sects promotes pluralism and achieves goal of avoiding reli-
gious oppression by majority); McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. CT. REV.
1, 8, 23 (terming strict neutrality "an attractively simple answer" and espousing pluralistic
approach); McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 933, 940-41 (1986) (Supreme Court has ignored fact that even neutral aid to religion
can be coercive); McConnell & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Issues Arising Under the
Religion Clauses, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 1 passim (1988) (giving neutrality economic definition
to better judge when governmental action becomes intrusive and espousing free market ap-
proach to religion).
"Permissible accommodation" may thus be defined as an area of allowable govern-
mental deference to the religious requirements of a pluralistic society in which a
variety of religious beliefs are deeply held. This kind of voluntary accommodation
should not be confused with the judicial or scholarly references to accommodation
required by the free exercise clause ......
Also distinguishable . . . is governmental action that violates the establish-
ment clause, often referred to as "forbidden" or "impermissible" accommodation.
Adams & Gordon, The Doctrine of Accommodation in the Jurisprudence of the Religion
Clauses, 37 DE PAUL L. REV. 317, 319 (1988) (emphasis in original).
, There are literally hundreds of law review articles examining the first amendment
religion clauses, including such recent symposia as Religion and the State, 27 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 833 (1986) and The Religion Clauses of the Constitution, 4 NoTRE DAME J.L., ETH-
ICs & PUB. POL'Y (1990). One can get a sense of the huge volume of scholarly literature by a
Lexis search. On February 15, 1991, a search in the "Allrev" law review Lexis file for "free
exercise clause" yielded 449 citations; "establishment clause" yielded 719 citations. For a
comprehensive bibliography of sources, see Payne, Uncovering the First Amendment: A Re-
search Guide to the Religion Clauses, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 825 passim
(1990).
65 See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The modern shift away from sepa-
ratism was evident in Everson, where the Court continued to maintain that the wall be-
tween church and state "must be kept high and impregnable," yet nevertheless managed to
sustain a New Jersey statute reimbursing parents for transportation of children attending
sectarian schools. Id. But see Pfeffer, The Establishment Clause: An Absolutist's Defense, 4
NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS & Pu. POL'Y 699, 704-27 (1990) (historical defense of strict
separationism); Rakove, The Madisonian Theory of Rights, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 245,
249 (1990) ("Madison stated his own position on religious liberty most explicitly in his Me-
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at least theoretically, must inexorably yield to the primacy of reli-
gious liberty. To expand on Professor Carter's insight,66 law faces
no greater challenge than dealing with, and being renewed by, the
resurgence of religious belief.67 Is the Court ready for the renais-
sance of the jurisprudence of religious liberty now feted in promi-
nent legal academic circles? Apparently not yet!
If religious liberty is the true core of religious jurisprudence,
then the Court should have rendered a decision diametrically op-
posite to that of Smith. If the Court, the political elite, and the
citizenry no longer countenance the imagery or the reality of a wall
of separation between church and state,68 then, concomitantly,
neither can it countenance the dichotomy between the scope of
core constitutional rights enjoyed by the dominant Christian main-
stream and the truncated rights of indigenous people. Religious
liberty protects everyone, or it protects no one. Professor Richard
Epstein most perceptively has suggested that religious liberty
eventually will teach painful lessons, to the consternation of the
morial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments of 1785.... No one reading the
Memorial could conclude intelligently that its author was anything but a strict separation-
ist"); Teitel, supra note 25, at 185 ("religious equality . . . is best preserved . .. by
nonintervention").
66 See Carter, Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating Religion as a Hobby, 1987
DuKE L.J. 977, 977.
Contemporary liberalism faces no greater dilemma than deciding how to deal with
the resurgence of religious belief. On the one hand, liberals cherish religion, as
they cherish all matters of private conscience, and liberal theory holds that the
state should do nothing to discourage free religious choice. At the same time con-
temporary liberals are coming to view any religious element in public moral dis-
course as a tool of the radical right for the reshaping of American society, and that
reshaping is something liberals want very much to discourage.
Id.
Id The United States has had a history of religious tradition, which may be intensifying.
"Religion occupies a unique and intensely personal place in the lives of many Americans.
About ninety-five percent of Americans believe in God or some universal spirit; more than
1200 primary religious groups and their innumerable individualized variations help to define
perceptions of ourselves and our relationship to others." Note, Burdens on the Exercise of
Religion: A Subjective Alternative, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1258, 1258 (1989); see also Benson,
Religious Liberty in America, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 883, 891 (1989) ("Not until I went to the
churches of America and heard her pulpits aflame with righteousness did I understand the
secret of her genius and power") (quoting Alexis de Tocqueville) (footnotes omitted). See
generally Pangle, Religion in the Thought of Some of the Leading American Founders, 4
NoTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 37 (1989) (examining religious philosophies of vari-
ous founding fathers).
68 See Wallace v. Jafree, 472 U.S. 38, 107 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (wall of
separation "based on bad history.., should be frankly and explicitly abandoned"); Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) ("metaphor itself is not a wholly accurate description
of the practical aspects of the relationship that in fact exists between church and state").
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orthodox Christian mainstream:
The conclusions here are not always to the liking of religious
people whose own codes can be as authoritarian as those con-
trived by secular parties. Thus, in my view, state prohibition of
polygamy on religious grounds is as incorrect as state toleration of
sacrifice .... Judicial decisions that 'invent' state interests op-
posed to polygamy reflect the same authoritarian tradition that
holds that the dominant political forces know better what is right
for others than others know for themselves. . . Our baseline
throughout is that religious liberty ends where force and fraud
begin, not before. 9
Religious liberty and the necessary concomitant repudiation of un-
constitutional burdens70 on the free exercise of religion should
have begun with the Court's reexamination of Smith, as a broad
spectrum of lawyers had urged.1
As long as the Court views the free exercise rights of native
people with condescension and denies them full cognizance, the
heart of the Bill of Rights will remain impoverished. The beliefs
and practices 72 of conventional Christian orthodoxies are not fully
:9 Epstein, supra note 2, at 385-86.
70 See, e.g., Lupu, supra note 3, at 934-35 (discussing which burdens on religious beliefs
are constitutionally cognizable); Marshall, Toward a Nonunifying Theory of Unconstitu-
tional Conditions: The Example of the Religion Clauses, 26 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 243 passim
(1989) (no one uniform baseline by which to judge whether conditions on religion are uncon-
stitutional); McConnell, Unconstitutional Conditions: Unrecognized Implications for the
Establishment Clause, 26 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 255, 275 (1989) ("Supreme Court has applied a
crude understanding of 'subsidy' under which receipt of their fair share of government bene-
fits by religious persons is said to constitute 'aid' to religion").
71 Court is Urged to Rehear Case on Ritual Drugs, N.Y. Times, May 16, 1990, at A16,
col. 1. The Court denied the petition for rehearing.
2 The unhelpful distinction between permitted belief and prohibited practice has been
repudiated. See Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of
Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1390-
92 (1981). The separation of conduct from belief exists primarily as an analytical construct.
Moreover, the belief-practice dichotomy is especially inapplicable to Smith. The ingestion of
sacramental peyote (or Eucharistic wine, for that matter) is intimately and inextricably tied
to the deepest manifestation of belief through prayer.
Congress explicitly recognized the integrity of conduct and belief when it exempted
from Prohibition the sacramental wine used by Christians in the ritual of communion. See
infra note 73. Why is ingestion of one chemistry-altering drug regarded as acceptable reli-
gious conduct, while the consumption of another, under essentially the same religiously in-
spired conditions, perceived as an instance of drug abuse? See Ball, supra note 54, at 54.
More importantly, how can those who experience Eucharist as a foundational sacramental
encounter with God deny (or allow the Court to deny) that same experience to others who
choose but a different substance? The Court's adherence to an arbitrary intellectual distinc-
tion bespeaks both a profound illogic and, more sadly, a distrustful rejection of human
experience.
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secured;7 3 Mergens augers Babel, and the Court thus has post-
poned, regrettably, the full flowering of the first amendment.
This comparative assessment of Mergens and Smith reflects
upon the troubled jurisprudence of religious liberty at this less-
than-celebratory bicentennial. For, as the dissent in Smith ex-
pressly cautioned, the Court "effectuates a wholesale overturning
of settled law concerning the Religion Clauses of our Constitution.
One hopes that the Court is aware of the consequences .... ,,74
Indeed.
73 Powerful religions generally have received sufficient political protections for their re-
ligious practices. See Volstead Act, 41 Stat. 305, 308-09 (1919) (exempting sacramental wine
from prohibition), repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (1933).
7' Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1616 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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